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10. Moral Conflict in the Minimally Conscious State
Joshua Shepherd#
MCS and Consciousness
After severe traumatic or anoxic brain injury, some patients enter into the minimally conscious state (MCS). 
MCS patients evince awareness of self and environment by way of inconsistent but discernibly purposeful 
behaviors—for example, visual fixation and pursuit, command following, and intelligible verbalization (Giacino 
et al., 2002). According to most, these behaviors are indicative of at least minimal conscious mental life: MCS 
patients are thought to possess consciousness. Further, by virtue of possessing consciousness, MCS patients are 
thought to possess a type of moral significance not attributed to patients who lack consciousness (e.g., patients in 
the vegetative state). How ought this inform decision making regarding MCS patients?
A complication accompanies the fact that the term consciousness can be taken to connote a number of distinct 
phenomena. Most relevant here is Ned Block’s (1995) well-known distinction between access consciousness and 
phenomenal consciousness. A mental state is access conscious if the information it carries is poised for use in 
reasoning and in control of behavior. By contrast, a mental state is phenomenally conscious if there is something 
“it is like” to be in it. Conceivably, these forms of consciousness dissociate in subjects: For all we know, it is 
possible that an MCS patient can possess access consciousness even though there is nothing “it is like” to be in 
MCS.
Arguably, both access and phenomenal consciousness are morally significant. According to Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Franklin Miller (2013), the abilities an agent possesses have moral significance. They argue that 
killing is morally wrong because it causes the loss of all abilities. Their position could be leveraged to generate a 
view in which the moral significance possessed by MCS patients is tied (at least in part) to the mental abilities 
they retain—the abilities that access consciousness enables. Alternatively, Charles Siewert (1998, 2013) has 
argued that phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic moral importance. According to Siewert, the possession of 
phenomenal consciousness undergirds a subject’s irreplaceability as a person, as well as his or her status as an apt 
target for empathy.
The moral significance of access consciousness deserves further consideration. In what follows, however, I focus 
on phenomenal consciousness. I do so in part because a treatment of both aspects in the same paper would 
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become unwieldy. But more importantly, it seems to me that much of the attention given to recent work on MCS
—such as the striking finding by Owen et al. (2006; Monti et al., 2010) that some MCS patients have the ability to 
voluntarily initiate and maintain mental imagery for protracted periods—accompanies the assumption that 
there is something it is like to be in MCS,1 and that this is so because phenomenal consciousness is the central 
conception of consciousness.
In the next section, I sketch a view in which the possession of phenomenal consciousness (henceforth: 
“consciousness”) is necessary for possession of (positive or negative degrees of) subjective well-being. It would 
seem that the possession of consciousness supplies caregivers reason to enhance the well-being of MCS patients. 
Unfortunately, as I discuss next, matters are complicated by a certain kind of moral conflict that arises in 
decision-making situations regarding MCS patient care. In many cases, it seems difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to respect an MCS patient’s autonomy—as embodied in her autonomously expressed prior wishes or 
in the wishes she would presently autonomously express were she competent to do so—while promoting the 
well-being she presently enjoys and will plausibly enjoy in the future. Later, I consider views according to which 
the moral conflict is only apparent, because considerations of autonomy trump considerations of well-being (or 
vice-versa). I argue that neither view is satisfying: We are left with genuine moral conflict. However, 
consideration of these views is salutary, because their weaknesses motivate a mixed view in which considerations 
of both autonomy and well-being should in many cases be weighed against each other, as well as other relevant 
moral considerations (e.g., considerations of distributive justice). In the final section, I draw four practical 
conclusions.
MCS and the Moral Significance of Consciousness
In my view, the type of moral significance that MCS patients possess, and VS patients lack, has to do with the 
potential for subjective well-being that MCS patients possess and VS patients lack. Subjective well-being is what 
a person has (to some degree) when it is true to say that her life is going well or poorly (to some degree) for her, 
or from her perspective. In focusing on subjective well-being, I ignore views of well-being that emphasize the 
importance of the objective properties of a subject’s life. Such views are often called objective list theories. As 
Derek Parfit has it, such theories enumerate the objective goods or bads that enhance or diminish well-being 
“whether or not these people would want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things” (Parfit, 1984, p. 
499; for a recent defense of an objective list theory, see Rice, 2013). I do not claim that proponents of such views 
misuse the term well-being. I focus on subjective well-being (henceforth: “well-being”) because doing so allows 
me to direct attention to features of the relevant cases that I regard as both morally important and importantly 
distinct from debates between subjectivists and objectivists about well-being.
What is the connection between consciousness and well-being? In my view, the possession of consciousness is a 
necessary condition for the possession of some negative or positive amount of well-being: Possession of 
consciousness just is possession of the kind of subjective perspective necessary for possession of well-being to 
some positive or negative degree. Kahane and Savulescu’s observation (2009, p. 13) is apt: “Think of how awry it 
seems to say ‘He led a good life—but there was absolutely nothing it was like to live that life.’” There must be 
something it is like for a subject in order for things to go well or poorly for that subject.
What determines one’s amount of well-being? We can distinguish between actual and potential amounts of well-
being: Amounts of actual well-being are closely tied to one’s actual experiences, and amounts of potential well-
being are closely tied to the types of experiences available to one. Consider two mentally and functionally 
identical MCS patients. By virtue of their identical cognitive, behavioral, and perceptual capacities, there is a 
1 Tim Bayne (2013) has argued that signs of agency (e.g., command following, intelligible verbalization) are markers of 
phenomenal consciousness. So, whatever the normative differences between access and phenomenal consciousness, if 
Bayne is right, then many of the reasons we have to attribute access consciousness to a subject will also serve as reasons 














sense in which these two patients possess the same amount of potential well-being. But suppose that one is 
neglected in an uncomfortable bed while the other receives very attentive, state-of-the-art treatment, frequent 
physical therapy, pain medication, and so on. Thanks to their actual experiences, the actual amount of well-being 
each enjoys will differ (and, over time, we can expect the amount of potential well-being to shift as well).
When considering the way in which experiences contribute to well-being, it is easy to simplify matters by 
focusing on simple examples (e.g., intense pleasure and intense pain). Doing so obscures a number of relevant 
and important issues. For example, are there dimensions other than positivity of experience that are relevant 
here (e.g., diversity of experience)? What is the relationship between a subject’s cognitive sophistication and the 
experience-types available to her? What phenomenal properties determine an experience-type’s contribution to 
well-being? Answering these difficult questions here would take us far afield. Even so, it is worth noting that 
human beings enjoy a wide range of experience-types, and that this fact is relevant to an understanding of 
amounts of well-being. Here is a comment by Peter Railton (2009):
Humans find reward in pleasant experience, to be sure, but also in such things as successful pursuit of 
abstract ideals, excellence in the exercise of skills and capacities, discovery and the creation of knowledge, 
friendship, humor, self-expression, aesthetic appreciation, romantic love, and commitment to kith and 
kin. (p. 94)
Of course, many of the experience-types available to healthy human subjects are not available to MCS patients. 
But recent neuroscientific work on MCS patients indicates that for at least some in this population, a variety of 
experience-types remain available. Many MCS patients retain high-level semantic processing of speech 
(Coleman et al., 2007). At least some MCS patients retain the capacity to deploy top-down visual attention 
(Monti et al., 2012), as well as the ability to voluntarily initiate and maintain mental imagery for protracted 
periods for the purposes of answering “yes or no” questions posed by experimenters (e.g., 30 seconds; see Monti 
et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006). This seems to indicate a fairly robust mental life—one that includes not only 
volition, but the higher cognitive capacities that support reasoning (Hampshire et al., 2013). The science of MCS 
is in its early days, but initial indications support the view that at least some MCS patients retain the capacity to 
both enjoy substantial amounts of well-being and suffer from a significant deprivation of well-being.
Moral Conflict
We want to know about the moral significance of the consciousness MCS patients possess in part because we 
want moral guidance regarding the care of MCS patients. But any plausible story about MCS patient care must 
address not only the moral significance of consciousness but also the interactions between this source of moral 
significance and other morally relevant considerations (e.g., distributive justice, the value of autonomy). In 
particular, MCS caregivers must often attend to a conflict that arises between considerations of patient well-
being and patient autonomy, where autonomy is understood as a the capacity to lead one’s own life, often by 
making decisions (e.g., about care) that define the nature and course of that life (see Dworkin, 1993, p. 222).
The case of W v. M (2011) illustrates the difficulties involved. At 43 years of age, M suffered brain damage from 
viral encephalitis. After she emerged from coma, doctors judged that she had entered the VS. Almost 4 years 
passed. Her family then sought authorization to remove treatment, at which point further examination of M led 
to a change in diagnosis, from VS to MCS. The family decided to press on, and the case—the first of its kind in 
England—went before the English Court of Protection.
Although there was no advance directive in this case, M’s prior wishes were clear. Regarding situations similar to 
her own, M had expressed to family and friends on numerous occasions that she would not want her life to be 
maintained. However, in court testimony, M’s caregivers painted a fairly complex picture of her current well-
being. M obviously experienced pain and discomfort, such as when her incontinence pad was changed. When 













certain songs were played for her, she reliably wept; once M was shown a video of a wedding, and she made a 
very distressed sound until caregivers turned off the video. But M’s caregivers provided evidence of positive 
experience as well. According to testimony provided to the court, M tapped her wrist in tune with fast music, 
relaxed when given hand massages, seemed to enjoy being taken into the garden or out into the sun when it was 
warm, seemed to smile (especially in response to certain familiar male caregivers, certain music, and television 
programs), seemed to communicate comfort or discomfort based on different types of moans, and seemed to 
behave in a playful manner with some caregivers.
As stipulated in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) (2007), the English Court of Protection was charged with 
deciding what was in M’s “best interests.” Although the MCA gives the court some latitude in determining best 
interests, the MCA’s Code of Practice makes clear that the standard centrally involves a patient’s past 
autonomous wishes and values:
5.32 . . . [I]n particular, the decision-maker should consider any statements that the person has previously 
made about their wishes and feelings about life-sustaining treatment. . . .
5.41 The person may have held strong views in the past which could have a bearing on the decision now 
to be made. All reasonable efforts must be made to find out whether the person has expressed views in the 
past that will shape the decision to be made. This could have been through verbal communication, 
writing, behaviour or habits, or recorded in any other way (for example, home videos or audiotapes). 
(2005)
However, in determining M’s best interests the court awarded little weight to her prior wishes and values. 
Instead, the court (W v. M, 2011) cited a principle of “preservation of life” (paragraph 7) as relevant, as well as 
M’s (actual and potential) well-being: “I find that she does have some positive experiences and importantly that 
there is a reasonable prospect that those experiences can be extended by a planned programme of increased 
stimulation” (paragraph 8). As a result of these considerations, the court refused the application to withdraw 
artificial nutrition and hydration.
Theorists have sharply criticized the court’s neglect of M’s prior wishes. According to Alexandra Mullock, “The 
legal requirement to consider the past wishes and views of incompetent patients should . . . be seen as . . . an 
obligation to respect autonomy” (2012, p. 2). Emily Jackson agreed and emphasized the need for everyone to 
establish their wishes in a way the court will be unable to neglect: “The moral of this sad story is that all of us—
even when we are completely healthy—need to think about whether we would wish to have [artificial nutrition 
and hydration] withdrawn if we were ever in a MCS, otherwise we risk being played music that makes us cry and 
being kept alive in part because stopping moaning when one has just had one’s incontinence pads changed is 
said to be evidence of contentment” (2012, p. 3).
Was the court right in privileging the existence of positive experiences, and the potential for extension of such 
experiences, over M’s autonomous wishes?2 This depends on one’s view about the relative importance of 
autonomy and well-being in cases involving MCS patient care. As M’s case makes vivid, in such cases we come 
across a moral conflict: As stated earlier, it appears difficult, and perhaps impossible, to respect an MCS patient’s 
autonomy while simultaneously promoting his or her well-being. We can grant that considerations of autonomy 
and of well-being are both morally relevant. All else being equal, we have reasons to respect a patient’s autonomy 
or to promote a patient’s well-being. Our problem is that, in the cases at issue, all is not equal. Considerations of 
autonomy and well-being seem to conflict. How ought we to adjudicate the conflict?
2 A further question is whether the court was legally right in citing a principle of preservation of life. Because I am 
interested in certain moral rather than legal aspects of this case, I do not consider this question. For a discussion of some 















Consider the following claim.
Autonomy trumps well-being
When an MCS patient’s prior wishes about her present state are clear, properly informed, and sufficiently strong, 
relevant decision makers should heed these wishes to the exclusion of any considerations of well-being.
Three points of clarification are relevant here. First, a patient’s prior wishes (that “P” be done) are clear, roughly, 
when their content is intelligible and sufficiently specific and when there is no conflicting evidence to the effect 
that the patient wished something incompatible with P. Second, a patient’s prior wishes are properly informed 
when there is sufficient indication that the patient understood the relevant circumstances surrounding her 
wishes. The patient need not understand every facet of the relevant circumstances, of course. But as a rule of 
thumb, a patient should be aware of information that might plausibly cause her to reconsider her prior wishes. 
Third, the requirement that the wishes be sufficiently strong is intended to exclude cases in which (1) the patient 
expressed the wish that P be done either hesitantly, or tentatively, or in some way that undermines confidence 
that the wish was genuine or (2) at any time after expressing the relevant wish, the patient expressed hesitance or 
anything that undermines confidence that the prior wish remained genuine. (In the case of an advance directive, 
this requirement might be met by conducting periodic reviews of the advance directive with its author.)
In general, medical and legal practice in related cases is consistent with the claim that Autonomy trumps well-
being. When patients lack competence to make care-related decisions, advance directives are typically given legal 
and medical authority. The patient’s past wishes, as embodied in the advance directive, take precedence over 
present well-being, even if the patient appears to enjoy a pleasant existence. In the case of W v. M, for example, 
the court noted that if M had made an advance directive indicating a wish to withdraw treatment, the directive 
would have determined the court’s decision. In a discussion of the perils of decision making for both MCS and 
VS patients, Joseph Fins and Nicholas Schiff gave voice to a common judgment: “It is our strongly held view that 
if a patient articulated a preference or completed an advance directive before losing decision-making capacity, 
the prior wishes should guide care” (2010, p. 23).
Even in the absence of an advance directive, many maintain that a patient’s prior wishes (insofar as they can be 
determined) should trump considerations of well-being. In the United States, when patients lack both an 
advance directive and the ability to make care-related decisions, it is common to utilize a “substituted judgment” 
standard. According to this standard, caregivers determine what to do by reference to what the patient would 
have decided had she been able to make the relevant decision. This standard clearly prizes autonomy over well-
being: The patient’s hypothetical autonomous decision is taken to be of primary moral importance.3
Why should we think, as many seem to, that the notion, Autonomy trumps well-being, is correct? Work on care-
related decision making in similar cases proves useful here. For example, although severe dementia differs in 
many important ways from MCS, structural similarities between severe dementia and MCS are illuminating. 
Consider Ronald Dworkin’s (1993) autonomy-friendly view regarding decision making for incompetent, severely 
demented patients.
Crucial to Dworkin’s position is a distinction between a subject’s critical interests and her experiential interests. 
The latter are tied to experiences we find enjoyable as experiences (e.g., watching football, eating well). The 
former are tied to “convictions about what makes a life good on the whole”—and these interests “represent 
critical judgments rather than just experiential preferences” (Dworkin, 1993, pp. 201–202). Dworkin has us 
consider the case of Margo, a severely demented patient whose prior critical interests not to live on in such a 
3 For criticism of the substituted judgment standard, see Torke, Alexander, and Lantos (2008).













state conflict with her present experiential interests. At present, Margo is happy. Even so, Dworkin maintains 
that Margo’s previously held critical interests take moral precedence. “If I decide, when I am competent, that it 
would be best for me not to remain alive in a seriously and permanently demented state, then a fiduciary could 
contradict me only by exercising an unacceptable form of moral paternalism” (p. 231).
Three types of consideration seem to ground Dworkin’s judgment. First is a view of the moral importance of 
autonomy, which for Dworkin has to do with an agent’s capacity to express her character in leading a life. 
“Recognizing an individual right of autonomy . . . allows us to lead our own lives rather than be led along by 
them, so that each of us can be . . . what we have made of ourselves” (Dworkin, 1993, p. 224). Second is a view of 
what makes a life go better or worse. Whereas Dworkin thinks that recognizing and satisfying the critical 
interests we ought to have genuinely makes our lives go better, the same is not true of experiential interests. 
According to Dworkin, “My life is not a worse life to have lived—I have nothing to regret, still less to take shame 
in—because I have suffered in the dentist’s chair” (p. 201). Third is a view of the moral importance of a life 
considered as a whole. For Dworkin, a life has moral value above and beyond the value that might attach to any 
of the events in it.
Because experiential interests are morally of little import, satisfying them is of little import as well. More 
important are a patient’s previously held critical interests. The satisfaction of these interests can make the 
patient’s life, when considered as a whole, go better. Thus, Dworkin rejects the view that “in the circumstances of 
dementia, critical interests become less important and experiential interests more so, so that fiduciaries may 
rightly ignore the former and concentrate on the latter” (p. 232). Interestingly, he rejects the relative moral 
significance of experiential interests by way of an analogy between patients in VS and severely demented 
patients: “Persistently vegetative patients have no sense of their own critical interests, but that is not a good 
reason for ignoring their fate, and it is not a good reason for ignoring the demented, either” (p. 232).
Insofar as Dworkin rejects the thought that the presence of consciousness makes a morally significant difference, 
of course, he appears to stray very far from commonsense morality.4 Moreover, his justification for doing so 
appears, in my view, rather thin. One reason is that I fail to find claims about the good of a subject’s life as a 
whole compelling.5 Making a full case for this claim is beyond the present scope, but consider briefly the fact 
that a single life often has many phases and takes many shapes. Values and religious commitments change, as do 
careers, relationships, capacities, and so on. Short of a well worked-out theory of the best possible shapes for a 
life, it is unclear to me what grounds judgments about the good of a subject’s life as a whole: The worry is that the 
tacit normative theory of life’s shape informing these judgments will not withstand critical scrutiny.
But grant momentarily that something like the good of a subject’s whole life exists. It remains possible to reject 
Dworkin’s judgments about what that implies. We can presume for present purposes that the patient in question 
experiences some positive level of well-being: Positive experiences are available to her, and we know how to 
provide them. There is thus an obvious sense in which the positive well-being she has experienced over the 
4 A recent survey by Gipson, Savulescu, and Kahane (2013) found that 40.2% of participants found it morally acceptable 
to remove treatment from VS patients, but only 20.6% found it morally acceptable to remove treatment from MCS 
patients. Further, 17.6% found it morally unacceptable to remove treatment from VS patients, and 41.2% found it morally 
unacceptable to remove treatment from MCS patients. This constitutes some evidence for the claim that the presence of 
consciousness has a significant role in commonsense morality.
5 Although differing from Dworkin at many places, Jeff McMahan agrees with his verdict concerning the relevant cases. 
Although McMahan judges that what is good for a relatively happy demented patient at present is the continuance of 
life, he maintains that the patient’s life as a whole, as well as the part of her life that occurred before dementia, have 
moral value. And he judges that the goodness of both of these are negatively affected by a failure to implement the 
patient’s prior wishes. Further, McMahan judges that because the healthy part of the patient’s life “is overwhelmingly the 
dominant part, its good should have priority . . . the Demented Patient’s present good ought to be sacrificed for the 
greater good of her earlier self, which is also the greater good of her life as a whole” (McMahan, 2002, pp. 502–503). 














course of her life continues to rise. Perhaps her whole life is better if it contains several years of pleasant, even if 
cognitively impaired, experience.
Dworkin will not like this suggestion, of course. Because Dworkin finds experiential interests of minor moral 
importance, he accords them little weight. In my view, this part of Dworkin’s approach is implausible: The 
satisfaction of experiential interests is centrally important to a subject’s well-being. Human agents go to great 
lengths—justifiably, it seems to me—to fulfill experiential interests (e.g., tasting a rare scotch, skiing a difficult 
backcountry chute). And it is arguable that the satisfaction of a critical interest is valuable in part because of the 
experiences such satisfaction engenders—experiences of meaningfulness, achievement, love, and so on.6 Notice 
again, however, that one can agree with Dworkin about the minor importance of experiential interests while 
disagreeing with his judgment about whether considerations of autonomy trump those of well-being. Whatever 
the moral significance of our critical interests, we need additional reasons to think this significance persists 
across massive changes to a subject such as occur when patients enter MCS. And we might also wonder—even 
granting that a whole life has its own kind of moral value—why the value of a whole life is so much more 
important than the value of a subject’s present experiences. Perhaps it is not.
In this connection, consider a case in which an MCS patient’s prior wishes were to remain alive, no matter what. 
And suppose that the patient’s case is a horrible one. She is in constant pain. Following Dworkin, we should keep 
her alive out of respect for her autonomy: Doing so will give her whole life the shape she intended it to have. In 
such a case, it is difficult to disagree with Seana Shiffrin’s verdict: “It seems cruel in such cases to force such 
people to live through agony so that they will fulfill a critical interest . . . they no longer recognize, accept or even 
understand” (Shiffrin, 2004, p. 210). In my view, this kind of case demonstrates that it is not in general true that 
considerations of autonomy trump considerations of well-being. The proposition that Autonomy trumps well-
being is false.7
One might object to this line of reasoning as follows.8 A properly informed subject who decides ‘to remain alive, 
no matter what’ has expressed a wish to endure constant pain rather than having treatment withdrawn. But this 
is irrational: All else being equal, it is irrational to choose pain over pain’s cessation. And irrational decisions are 
not properly expressive of autonomy.
It is true that autonomy requires the capacity for rational behavior in general (see Berofsky 1995, p. 10). But 
particular decisions may properly express autonomy even if they fall short of optimal rationality. Smoking is an 
irrational activity, indicative of irrational desires, preferences, and decisions, and yet decisions to smoke can 
nonetheless express an agent’s autonomy. Because rationality and autonomy come apart, it seems possible that a 
subject can irrationally, but autonomously, decide to remain alive in the face of great pain.9 And if so, then cases 
likely exist in which considerations of well-being override considerations of autonomy.
6 Recall Wilfred Sellars’ reaction to Daniel Dennett’s eliminativism about qualia (the purportedly intrinsic, ineffable 
properties of experience): “But Dan, qualia are what make life worth living!” Dennett commented: “If you didn’t have 
qualia, you would have nothing to enjoy (but also no suffering, presumably). It is generally supposed—though seldom if 
ever expressed—that it would not be any fun to be a zombie” (Dennett, 2005, p. 91).
7 One might worry that because of moral asymmetries between negative and positive hedonic experiences, this case 
does not generalize to cases involving positive amounts of well-being. Perhaps, for example, there is a duty to prevent 
negative hedonic experiences if possible, but no duty to promote positive hedonic experiences if possible. If so, perhaps 
an MCS patient’s positive well-being never overrides considerations of autonomy. But I think this worry, as expressed, 
goes too far. Plausibly a patient’s prior wishes are more easily outweighed when that patient is in pain, but it is too strong 
(in my view) to claim that no amount of positive well-being could outweigh a patient’s prior wishes.
8 Thanks to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for suggesting this line of response.
9 Both irrationality and the pain a patient endures come in degrees. So one might argue that, at a certain point, the 
irrationality of a decision undermines autonomy: Some decisions are too irrational to count as autonomous. And perhaps 
decisions to endure a great amount of pain cross the relevant threshold. But all I need is a case that does not cross this 














Although Autonomy trumps well-being is probably the majority view (at least among medical and legal 
professionals), one finds pockets of dissent.10 In this section I consider an argument for a view on the opposite 
end of the spectrum.
Well-being trumps autonomy
When an MCS patient’s present and potential future well-being is clear, relevant decision makers should aim to 
promote patient well-being to the exclusion of any considerations of autonomy.
The line of argumentation I am interested in (although others exist11) goes as follows.12
Not Really Autonomous
1. An agent J’s prior wishes regarding her care have moral weight regarding decisions about her care only if 
they are rightly considered expressions of J’s autonomous judgments or decisions.
2. An agent J’s judgment or decision is rightly considered autonomous only if J’s judgment or decision is 
appropriately informed.
3. For any human agent J, no judgment or decision J makes regarding J’s care in MCS can be appropriately 
informed.
4. Thus, for any MCS patient J, J’s prior wishes regarding care do not have moral weight for decisions 
regarding her care.
Should we accept this argument? I find point (1) plausible: Non-autonomous judgments or decisions are not the 
kinds of things typically taken to be enforceable on a patient’s behalf. I find point (2) plausible as well. Although 
some work is needed to specify what counts as being appropriately informed, some such condition seems to 
apply. Judgments or decisions that proceed from bad information are paradigmatically nonautonomous. Much 
of the work in this argument is done, it seems, by point (3). Why think that no human agent—even one apprised 
of the relevant scientific and clinical literature—can meet the relevant information condition regarding her own 
care while minimally conscious?
Begin by appreciating our ignorance about what it is like to be minimally conscious. MCS patients have 
undergone radical cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral changes, and the nature of their day-to-day experience 
is difficult to fathom. It is unclear whether their experience is analogous to that of less cognitively sophisticated 
creatures, or of other brain-damaged humans, or whether analogies simply fail here. The patient M reliably wept 
when she heard Elvis sing, “You were always on my mind.” What was hearing this song like for her? Was she 
experiencing vivid memories of some painful experience? Was this simply a reaction to stimuli, the result of the 
song’s tune triggering some behavioral schema oddly unconstrained because of her injury? Might it have been 
pleasant for her to weep—a kind of rudimentary experience of catharsis? At present, it is impossible to say.
threshold, and in which the patient’s well-being overrides the (somewhat) irrational, autonomous decision to “stay alive, 
no matter what.” It is plausible that some cases fall at this point along the spectrum.
10 Consider Rebecca Dresser’s complaint: “Legal decision-makers have been preoccupied with safeguarding 
incompetent patients’ rights of self-determination and privacy, largely overlooking these patients’ more immediate 
interests in having their present well-being maintained. This legal approach is . . . insufficiently protective of the 
incompetent patient’s genuine interests” (Dresser, 1986, p. 373).
11 Some suggest that considerations of autonomy are either irrelevant or diminished because, in cases of severe brain 
injury, the patient is no longer the same person as she was when she expressed her prior wishes. For discussion of this 
kind of thought, see Dresser (1986), DeGrazia (1999), Shiffrin (2004).














How much should we make of our ignorance concerning what it is like? Matters are complicated by our present 
lack of a rigorous account of what level or quality of information is sufficient to render a judgment, or a decision 
based upon it, autonomous. Even so, it is plausible to think that many judgments or decisions about care when 
in MCS that people would and will in the near future make would and will be insufficiently informed, simply 
because they would and will be based on either misinformation about MCS or untutored (and implausibly vivid) 
acts of imagination.
In a recent study of lay attitudes toward withdrawal of treatment decisions, Jacob Gipson, Guy Kahane, and 
Julian Savulescu (2013) gave participants a clinical description of MCS and asked them to respond to a 
statement to the effect that they would want treatment withdrawn if they were in such a state. Some 41% agreed, 
36% were unsure, and 22% disagreed. Participants were also given a clinical description of locked-in syndrome 
(LIS), a condition in which patients retain normal consciousness and cognitive functioning but are almost totally 
paralyzed. Often, such patients can communicate with others only by moving their eyes. Interestingly, 
participants’ responses to a statement that they would want treatment withdrawn if they were in such a state 
mirrored their responses to the statement about MCS: 36% agreed, 39% were unsure, and 25% disagreed.
We know—although presumably most of the participants did not—that patients in LIS report relatively high 
degrees of subjective well-being. Reporting on a recent survey of LIS patients, Bruno et al. (2011a) noted: “Our 
data show that a non-negligible group of chronic LIS survivors self-report a meaningful life and their demands 
for euthanasia are surprisingly infrequent” (p. 7). More specifically, 72% of their LIS patients reported positive 
levels of happiness, 8% reported having suicidal thoughts often (and 24% reported suicidal thoughts 
occasionally), and 13% reported feeling depressed. It is thus plausible that a high proportion of the participants 
in Gipson et al.’s study who judged that they would want treatment withdrawn if in LIS would not, in fact, want 
treatment withdrawn when in LIS.13 This supports the following two claims. First, the judgments these 
participants made regarding LIS were insufficiently informed regarding what it is like to be in LIS and thus 
nonautonomous in the relevant sense. Second, the judgments these participants made regarding MCS, because 
they were based on a similar lack of relevant information concerning what it is like to be in MCS, are 
insufficiently informed and thus nonautonomous in the relevant sense.
The problem is compounded by medical and legal experts who offer insufficiently informed assertions from a 
position of authority. Consider Emily Jackson’s assertion, made in the context of criticizing the court’s decision in 
W v M: “Imagining myself in M’s shoes, I would regard a life in which I was totally dependent on others for all 
aspects of daily care; immobile; doubly incontinent; moved by a hoist; being played songs that made me cry and 
uttering occasional words like ‘where am I’ and ‘bloody hell’ as, to put it bluntly, a living hell” (Jackson, 2012, p. 
1). Jackson’s assertion appears to be based primarily on an untutored act of imagination, with additional 
justification offered by a selective portrayal of M’s condition.
In a frequently quoted passage, Ashwal and Cranford (2002) asserted that “if there were a better understanding 
of MCS, especially the critical issues of consciousness and likelihood for pain and suffering, a broader consensus 
would develop, that being in a permanent MCS would actually be worse than being in a permanent VS” (p. 29). 
Aside from an odd claim about what we would judge if we knew more, Ashwal and Cranford’s assertion appears 
to be based on the thought that because they are conscious, MCS patients can feel pain. But MCS patients can 
feel pleasure as well. Plausibly, some can undergo a wider range of experience-types than pain and pleasure. 
Ashwal and Cranford’s assertion is unhelpful.
It seems plausible, then, that some (perhaps even most) judgments or decisions about care for MCS patients are 
insufficiently informed. (This raises important practical questions about how best to inform authors of advance 
directives as well as MCS patient caregivers and family: see the next section of this chapter for discussion.) But 
13 Of course, someone in LIS could rationally demand the withdrawal of treatment. Moreover, we might be morally 
bound to honor such a decision.













this is not enough to deliver the conclusion of Not Really Autonomous. One might plausibly maintain that our 
inability to know what it is like to be minimally conscious is an epistemic constraint future science will 
overcome. Once we know more about the brain, more about the etiology of brain injury, more about prospects 
for recovery, more about methods of treatment, more about the cognitive abilities of MCS patients, we will be 
able to make rough-and-ready judgments about what it is like. Already in M’s case, caregivers estimated that 30% 
of M’s days were unpleasant. Perhaps soon we will be able to say “MCS patient Z has cognitive abilities A, B, and 
C, but lacks D and E; she is in pain for X minutes a day, principally when she undergoes experience-types F and 
G; she enjoys experiencing H and I, and there is reason to expect that with proper treatment she will one day be 
able to spend much of her time enjoying L, M, and N.” If this is right, then it would seem Not Really 
Autonomous fails. In principle, it should be possible to make judgments or decisions about MCS care that meet 
plausible criteria for being appropriately informed.
A proponent of Not Really Autonomous might reply that the change to experience brought on by brain injury is 
so radical that our characterizations of it—no matter how empirically informed—will fail to meet plausible 
criteria for being appropriately informed. The thought here is that whatever characterizations of life in MCS we 
are able to give will fail to respect the radically different phenomenal character of life in MCS. If we cannot know 
what it is like to be in MCS—what it is like for an MCS patient to be in pain; to experience pleasure; to 
experience auditory, tactile, or visual stimulation; to have one’s mind wander; or to focus one’s attention on 
something—then we cannot make an informed decision about whether we want to carry on in such a 
condition.14
But there are two significant problems with this reply. First, if it is taken seriously, it threatens to undermine the 
argument’s chief aim. For, if we face radical ignorance about what it is like to be minimally conscious, then we 
face radical ignorance about how to enhance the well-being of an MCS patient. But in the present context, the 
point of Not Really Autonomous is to undermine considerations of autonomy without simultaneously 
undermining considerations of well-being.
Second, it is dubious that we can know nothing about what it is like for an MCS patient. Certainly our ignorance 
is vast, but we have little reason to believe that experience in a human being would take a form totally 
inaccessible to us. We believe, after all, that the conscious lives of healthy adults share many similarities in spite 
of huge differences in cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral capacities. Plausibly, we should believe the same 
thing about MCS patients. We should expect that pain is bad for them, that pleasure is good, that a variety of 
experiences is better than a life of monotony, that greater cognitive sophistication tracks greater potential for 
well-being, and that behavior—even if confined primarily to neural responses to stimuli—is a fair indicator of 
what things are like for such patients.
Not Really Autonomous fails to secure victory for the position represented by Well-being trumps autonomy. Even 
so, a weaker form of the argument—one that emphasizes the epistemic difficulties we face when making 
decisions about MCS care, without claiming that they are in principle surmountable—is very plausible. 
Decisions about MCS care that wish to accord significance to a patient’s prior wishes should pay far closer 
attention than is now common to the information on which those wishes were based.
14 In a recent paper, L. A. Paul (2015) emphasized our ignorance about “what it will be like” for a whole class of 
transformative experiences (she focused on having a child). According to Paul, in light of our ignorance, decisions about 
courses of action that involve transformative experiences are neither rational nor irrational. There are obvious affinities 
between this argument and the one explored in the previous paragraph, but the point made there is distinct from Paul’s. 















In the view I have sketched, a certain amount of well-being is available to MCS patients by virtue of their 
possession of consciousness. This fact generates a moral reason to promote MCS patient well-being. But I have 
also noted the difficulties that arise in decision-making situations concerning MCS patient care. Because 
considerations of autonomy often conflict with considerations of well-being, we are faced with difficult choices. 
It would be easier if one type of consideration systematically outweighed another. However, troubles beset both 
the view that autonomy trumps well-being and the view that well-being trumps autonomy. The failures of these 
extreme views motivate a mixed view, in which considerations of both autonomy and well-being should in many 
cases be weighed against each other, as well as other relevant moral considerations (e.g., considerations of 
distributive justice). To finish, I wish to draw four practical conclusions from this discussion.
First, more attention should be paid to the informational deficits facing authors of advance directives and MCS 
patient caregivers and family. Given the gravity of decisions about MCS patient care, such attention might focus 
on (1) better ways to educate the relevant decision makers about emerging empirical work on MCS (e.g., work of 
the sort featured in this volume) and (2) the implementation of practical decision procedures that are sensitive to 
the informational needs of the relevant decision makers. Short of the proper educational and decision-making 
procedures, injunctions to consider “what the patient would have wanted” or what is in the patient’s “best 
interests” might not be good enough. It is, of course, difficult to say from the armchair what decision-making 
procedures would be best. In my view, such procedures should be developed by those who are sensitive to the 
very practical constraints and difficulties attending these decisions. For example, Joseph Fins (2006) noted a 
difficulty arising from local features of health care in the United States:
[B]ecause of the geographic separation of acute care and rehabilitation settings, many acute care clinicians 
have little idea about the course of their patients after hospital discharge. This can lead to distortions 
among acute care practitioners about what might be achieved over time. This may breed a sense of 
nihilism about the value of ongoing care because patient prognosis is based upon their limited perspective 
and contextual experiences. (p. 174)
Decision-making procedures should be designed to reflect the fact that informational deficits (such as 
overreliance on a limited clinical perspective) often influence care decisions in important ways. Ideally and 
minimally, regarding decisions to withdraw treatment, both physicians and family members (and, if competent, 
MCS patients themselves) should be given the time and opportunity to assess the same body of relevant 
information and to jointly consider diagnostic prospects.
Second, the moral authority generally accorded to considerations of autonomy in end-of-life decision making is, 
in cases of MCS patient care, out of place. Short of good reasons to think so, we should not let advance directives 
or clearly expressed prior wishes trump considerations of well-being. Rather, advance directives or clearly 
expressed prior wishes should be assessed based on the quality of the information on which they were based. 
Further, even when prior wishes are thought to meet the relevant informational requirement, these wishes 
should not trump considerations of well-being. Prior wishes should be allowed to offer guidance without 
dictating the decision to be made.
Third, in such decision-making situations, more attention should be given to considerations of distributive 
justice. I have not focused on such considerations here, but they are clearly relevant. Any decision to withdraw 
treatment from an MCS patient who enjoys some amount of positive well-being harms that patient to some 
degree—at least in the sense that it causes the patient loss of potential well-being. Some argue that 
considerations of autonomy, or the shape of a patient’s whole life, justify this harm. Considerations of 
distributive justice are another potential justifier. Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu (2012) argue that in 
some cases—and they suggest M’s case is one of these—considerations of distributive justice support the 













withdrawal of treatment. The reasoning is straightforward. Caring for an MCS patient is expensive. Funds are 
limited. If all else is equal, we should distribute funds in a fair way: We must answer the “relative question of 
whether one life is more worth living or less expensive to support than another” (p. 2). Of course, whether one 
life is more worth living than another depends crucially on the amount of well-being available to a subject, as 
well as on how the distribution of funds will influence relevant subjects. More work is required to sort out the 
best ways to think about how distributive justice should influence care-related decisions for MCS patients.
Fourth, the moral importance of a patient’s amount of well-being provides an urgent moral reason to support 
research that improves our diagnostic capacities. MCS is not a static condition. Retained cognitive, perceptual, 
and behavioral capacities vary widely among MCS patients. Recognizing this, Bruno et al. (2011b) recently 
proposed a refinement of the diagnosis of MCS, into categories of MCS+ and MCS−. They draw the distinction 
as follows:
MCS+ was defined by the presence of (a) command following, (b) intelligible verbalization or (c) gestural 
or verbal yes/no responses. In contrast, MCS− patients only show minimal levels of behavioural 
interaction characterized by the presence of non- reflex movements such as: (a) orientation of noxious 
stimuli, (b) pursuit eye movements that occur in direct response to moving or salient stimuli, (c) 
movements or affective behaviors that occur appropriately in relation to relevant environmental stimuli. 
(p. 1375)
The categorization of MCS is likely to undergo additional refinement as our understanding of MCS increases. 
Plausibly, token cases of MCS permit large differences in potential for well-being. Therefore, although MCS is 
rightly thought to be morally different from VS, it is possible that token cases of MCS admit of moral differences 
at least as large. Decision-making regarding MCS patient care should be based on as accurate an understanding 
as possible of the capacities each MCS patient retains, as well as those capacities they might, with adequate 
treatment, one day recover.
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